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Footnotes 
1. Information from National Instant Criminal Background Check
Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
2. See CALLIE M. REUNISON AND SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE (May 2000), at 1; PATRICIA TJADEN AND NANCY THOENNES,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE AND THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE & CONSEQUENCES OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (July 2000), at 10 [hereinafter NIJ-
CDC Report].
3. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND AGE OF VICTIM, 1993-1999 (Oct.
2001), at 3.  Data show, however, that women between the ages of
35 and 49 are the most vulnerable to homicide by their intimate
partner.  See id.
4. See NIJ-CDC Report, supra note 2, at 1.
5. In a study of domestic homicides in Florida, 65% of intimate
homicide victims had physically separated from the perpetrator
prior to their death.  See Florida Governor’s Task Force on
Firearms and domestic violence are a deadly combination.As the examples on the following page show,1 abusers whogain access to firearms pose a lethal threat both to those
they have abused and to the wider community.  Even where
laws exist to disarm abusers and prevent them from purchasing
new firearms, absent effective implementation of the laws—by
judges, as well as by others in the civil and criminal justice sys-
tem—survivors of domestic violence and the broader commu-
nity continue to remain at risk of death or serious injury.
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The statistics regarding domestic violence in this country
are startling.  The United States Department of Justice and oth-
ers have estimated that each year at least one million violent
crimes are committed against persons by their current or for-
mer spouses or dating partners.2 People of all ages and all gen-
der, ethnic, cultural, and demographic backgrounds are
abused, but statistically the largest number are young women
between the ages of 16 and 24.3 Overall, the vast majority of
victims of intimate partner violence are women.4
Studies and experience show that the time of leaving a rela-
tionship can be the most dangerous for a survivor, a phenom-
enon that is often referred to as “separation violence.”  The act
of separating—whether through divorce, by physical or legal
separation, or by ending a dating relationship—often triggers
an escalation of the violence.5 In fact, prior abuse and separa-
tion, or announced plans to separate, appear to be the biggest
risk factors indicating that the abuser will seriously injure or
kill the survivor.6
Judges need to understand this phenomenon because many
survivors, in the course of separating from their abusers, seek
recourse through the legal system; they may seek a protection
order or call law enforcement personnel to initiate a criminal
prosecution.  Because these acts of separation are intended to
wrest control away from the abuser, they typically will be per-
ceived as a significant threat, and the abuser will react by tak-
ing steps to re-exert control over the survivor.  The abuser—
even if there has been limited documented evidence of abuse
in the relationship—may take extreme measures to reestablish
control.  In some instances, the abuser will choose homicide as
the ultimate exercise of power over the victim.
If the abuser has access to a firearm, it is far more likely that
homicide will indeed be the result.  Research shows that fam-
ily and intimate partner assaults involving firearms are 12
times more likely to result in death than those that do not
involve firearms.7 Approximately two-thirds of the intimate
partner homicides in this country are committed using guns.8
In cases in which the abuser’s use of a firearm does not
result in death, the survivor instead may suffer a brutal, life-
altering injury.  A recent study of survivors of severe battering
described such cases, including one in which the abuser
“essentially shot off [the survivor’s] leg—what was left of it had
to be amputated—as she pleaded for her life.” 9
Abusers who kill their intimate partners also may injure or
kill third parties.  One study found that in 38 percent of homi-
cides involving intimate partners the perpetrator kills more
than one person; other victims include children, intervenors,
and bystanders.10
JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Each year, judges across the country issue many thousands
of civil protection orders.  These orders, entered after the court
has found evidence of abuse, are designed to protect the sur-
vivor from further acts of abuse, including assaults, threats,
harassment, and destruction of property.  As described more
fully below, judges in most states are authorized to include in
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Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Project
Report, at 44, table 7 (1997) [hereinafter Florida Mortality Review
Report].
6. See Kathryn Ann Farr, Battered Women Who Were “Being Killed and
Survived It”: Straight Talk from Survivors, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
267, 268 (2002) (citing additional studies) [hereinafter Being
Killed].
7. See L.E. Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes
in Family and Intimate Assaults, 267 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N. 3043
(1992); Johns Hopkins University, Center for Gun Policy and
Research, Factsheet: Firearm Injury and Death in the United States
(revised April 2002), available at http://www.jhsph.edu/bin/i/g/
US_factsheet.pdf.
8. See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Homicide Trends in the U.S.; “Intimate Homicide” (visited August
29, 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/
intimates.htm.
9. See Farr, Being Killed, supra note 6, at 277.
10. Florida Mortality Review Report, supra note 5, at 51, table 28.
their protection orders provisions that deny a respondent
access to firearms.  Additionally, some state laws authorize
removal of firearms in misdemeanor cases of domestic vio-
lence, including at the time of bail, arraignment, or conviction.
Over the past decade, judges have received unprecedented
training about domestic violence.  Often missing from the cur-
riculum, however, has been the issue of firearms, and how the
surrender, return, or denial of firearms is related to domestic
violence civil and criminal cases.  The issue may be ignored
because judges in jurisdictions without state law on the issue
believe that it is federal law, and they needn’t worry about that,
or because judges have philosophical differences of opinion
about the propriety or efficacy of state and federal laws on the
subject.  Whatever the reason, judges will be unable to fulfill
their judicial responsibilities if they do not educate themselves
about the various restrictions that Congress and state legisla-
tures have enacted to limit certain defendants’ access to
firearms in order to promote public safety and prevent death
and severe injuries in domestic abuse cases.
The specific requirements regarding removal of firearms
under state and federal law will be discussed in detail below.
In some cases, removal is discretionary; in others, it is manda-
tory.  It is crucial for judges to understand the circumstances
under which state and federal laws provide that firearms must
be removed.  However, judges should also be sensitive to the
rationale behind provisions for discretionary removal and
ensure that, at the very least, they conduct an appropriate col-
loquy from the bench in the event firearms are not removed.
Given the safety issues discussed above, survivors and the
public at large may be at considerable risk if abusers retain
access to firearms, even under circumstances where removal is
discretionary.  Consequently, the decision to allow an abuser to
retain firearms should be made only after careful consideration
of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
This article is intended to provide judges with an overview
of the state and federal laws that address domestic violence and
firearms.  Because knowledge of the governing laws alone is
insufficient to enable judges to take meaningful steps to safe-
guard survivors and the community, we also provide several
examples of good judicial practices that can facilitate effective
implementation and enforcement of the laws.  We hope that
judges around the country, irrespective of the unique features
of their jurisdictions’ laws, can integrate these prudent prac-
tices into their daily work.
THE APPLICABLE LAWS
Laws at both the state and federal levels prohibit abusers and
stalkers from possessing firearms and ammunition.  Many
states have enacted laws that specifically authorize judges to
prohibit firearm possession or to order seizure of illegally pos-
sessed firearms under certain circumstances, such as where an
abuser used or threatened to use a firearm during an incident
of abuse or where the abuser is subject to an active protection
order.  At the federal level, recently enacted provisions of the
Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., prohibit firearm pos-
session by abusers who are subject to an order of protection sat-
isfying certain requirements or who have been convicted of a
qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.  These
state and federal laws reflect a growing understanding and con-
sensus among the voting public and their elected representa-
tives that abusers present a heightened threat to survivors when
they have access to a firearm.
In this section, we present an overview of the firearm prohi-
bitions enforceable by judges under state law, followed by a dis-
cussion of the federal firearm laws relating to domestic violence.
Then, before turning to an examination of the recommended
judicial practices regarding firearm laws and domestic violence,
we explore the sometimes confusing relationship between the
state and federal firearm laws, as well as the roles and responsi-
bilities of state court judges regarding their enforcement.
State Laws
Over the past several years, state legislatures throughout
the country have enacted laws that restrict domestic violence
perpetrators’ access to firearms and ammunition.  Not surpris-
ingly, the states have taken a wide variety of approaches to the
issue, some imposing mandatory prohibitions on certain
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July 2001: A man attempting to purchase a gun fills out the
required federal form so that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation can complete a criminal background check.
During the check, the FBI determines that the purchaser is
subject to a protection order that may prohibit him from pur-
chasing the gun under federal law.  The records do not indi-
cate, however, whether the required relationship between the
purchaser and the protected person exists.  Despite contact-
ing the court that issued the protection order, the clerk of
court’s office, the sheriff’s office, and the police department
in the issuing jurisdiction, the FBI cannot obtain the neces-
sary information within the requisite three-business-day
period and the gun shop is able to sell the gun to the pur-
chaser.  One hour later, the purchaser uses the gun to mur-
der the person who obtained the protection order, his former
live-in girlfriend.  The FBI learns too late that the transaction
was illegal under federal law.
December 2001: On Christmas Day, a man murders his wife
and 13-year-old daughter with a firearm.  He was able to pur-
chase the gun without a criminal background check because
he possessed a concealed weapon permit that had been
issued several years earlier by a state court.  A few months
before the murders, the very court that granted the permit
had issued a protection order against the murderer and had
arraigned him on domestic battery charges.  The protection
order disqualified the murderer from purchasing or possess-
ing a firearm, but the court never revoked the concealed
weapon permit and the protection order had not been
entered into any registry.  The murdered wife and daughter
were the protected parties on the protection order.
January 2002: A man shoots and kills a law school dean and
injures others.  The killer had been arrested on charges of
domestic battery in August 2001 and had been released with-
out bail conditions restricting firearm possession.  The gun
used in the murder was found with the gun store tags intact.
THE RISKS ARE REAL
offenders and others leav-
ing the power to disarm
offenders largely to the
court’s discretion.  This sec-
tion provides a brief
overview of the types of
firearm prohibitions that
have been enacted by the
states, including both those
enforceable by civil-court
judges and those enforce-
able by judges who hear
criminal matters.
Civil System
In at least nine states, entry of a civil domestic violence
protection order meeting certain criteria subjects the respon-
dent to a mandatory prohibition on the possession of
firearms.11 For instance, Florida law prohibits possession of a
firearm or ammunition by a person subject to a valid final pro-
tection order that enjoins that person from committing acts of
domestic violence,12 while New Hampshire law requires relin-
quishment of firearms and ammunition by a respondent if the
court finds that the respondent represents a credible threat to
the safety of the survivor.13 In states that have a mandatory
prohibition, judges do not have any discretion over whether
the prohibition applies; in some instances, however, a specific
finding may be required to trigger the prohibition under state
law.
A more common approach is to give judges issuing civil pro-
tection orders the discretion to include a provision prohibiting
firearm possession within the order.14 In a few states, such pro-
visions may be included in both temporary, ex parte protection
orders and in final orders entered after the respondent has had
an opportunity to be heard.  Some states also authorize judges
to include a prohibition against purchasing or otherwise acquir-
ing a firearm for the duration of a protection order.15
Some states, recognizing that an abuser who possesses a
license or permit to carry firearms may be able to circumvent a
state or federal law firearm prohibition by evading a back-
ground check, authorize judges to order the respondent to sur-
render the permit or license for the duration of a protection
order.16 For instance, under New York law the court is
required to suspend any existing license possessed by the
respondent and to order the respondent ineligible for such a
license upon issuance of a protection order if the court finds
that the conduct that led to issuance of the order involved the
infliction of serious physical injury, the use or threatened use
of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or behavior con-
stituting a violent felony.17
Some of the firearm prohibitions described above are sub-
ject to exceptions intended to allow law enforcement officers
to possess firearms despite being subject to an order that
would otherwise disqualify a respondent from possession.  For
instance, the mandatory firearm prohibition imposed by
Wisconsin law against a person subject to a domestic violence
restraining order does not apply to peace officers if they are
required to possess a firearm while on or off duty.18 As dis-
cussed more fully below, one of the federal statutes that pro-
hibits firearm possession is also subject to an exception for law
enforcement officers and military personnel.
Criminal System
Judges hearing criminal matters in many states also have
legal authority to deny domestic violence perpetrators access
to firearms.  Depending on the state, the prohibition may be
imposed as a bail or other condition of release, or it may be
included as a probation condition.  In some states, a firearm
prohibition is a mandatory condition imposed on all defen-
dants charged with a domestic violence crime.19 In other
states, a firearm prohibition is highly favored and must be
imposed absent a special finding by the judge.20 In still other
states, a prohibition is required only if the judge makes certain
findings regarding the likelihood that the defendant will use a
firearm in further acts of violence.21
Upon conviction of a domestic violence crime, defendants
in many states become subject to a firearm prohibition,
although in some cases a firearm must have been used in the
offense.22 In most cases, the prohibition is mandatory, but at
least one state (Minnesota) makes the prohibition discre-
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In many states, a
firearm prohibition
is a mandatory
condition imposed
on all defendants
charged with a
domestic
violence crime.
11. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, §
1448(a) (2002); FLA. STAT. CH. 790.233 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §
134-7(2002); MD. CODE ANN., ART. 27, § 445(d)(2)(v) (2002);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:5 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:4(A)
(2002); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2002).
12. See FLA. STAT. CH. 790.233 (2002).
13. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:5 (2002).
14. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3602 (2002); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112A-14(b)(14.5) (2002);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(c)(4) (2002); MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 4-506(d)(12) (2002); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 600.2950(1)(e)
(2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201 (2002); N.J. REV. STAT. §§
2C:25-28, 2C:25-29(16) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866 (2002);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105(c)(6) (2002); TEX. FAM. CODE §
85.022(e) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.2 (2002); W. VA.
CODE § 48-27-403 (2002).
15. In states that do not explicitly authorize firearm removal as part of
a protection order, judges may be able to use the “catch-all” relief
provision available in many protection order codes to order that
the respondent not possess firearms for the duration of the order.
16. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 209A, § 3C (2002); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 842-a(1)-(2) (2002); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(A)(7)
(2002); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.187 (2002).
17. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842-a(1)-(2) (2002).
18. See WIS. STAT. § 813.12(2002); see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 85.022
(2002).
19. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-204 (2002); FLA. STAT. CH.
790.065(c)(1) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 806-11 (2002).
20. See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 646.93(c)(3) (2002); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/110-10 (5) (2002).
21. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.14(1)(b) (2002); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07.1-13 (2002).
22. See, e.g., DEL CODE. ANN. TIT. 11 § 1448(a) (2002); FLA. STAT. CH.
790.065 (2002); MD. CODE ANN. ART. 27, § 445 (2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(7) (2002); TEX. P. CODE § 46.04(2)(b)
(2002); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7 (2002).
23. See MINN. STAT. § 609.2242(3)(c) (2002).
24. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A)-(C) (2002).
26. See 18 U. S.C. § 921(a)(32) (2002).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (penalty imposed for “knowingly” vio-
lating section 922(g)(8)).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(8)(A)-(B).
29. See Letter from Stephen R. Rubenstein, Associate Chief Counsel,
tionary and requires that the court make written findings to
support an order not to possess firearms.23
Federal Laws
Congress has also recognized the importance of restricting
domestic violence abusers’ access to firearms.  In 1994, along
with the passage of the original Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA),24 Congress enacted the first federal legislation to
address this issue directly.  The new law, which amended the
Gun Control Act of 1968 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. section
922(g)(8), makes it a federal crime for a person who is subject
to a qualifying protection order to possess a firearm or ammu-
nition, or to ship or receive a firearm or ammunition in inter-
state or foreign commerce.  To qualify under section 922(g)(8),
a protection order must:
(1) have been issued after a hearing of which the respondent
received actual notice, and at which the respondent had an
opportunity to participate;
(2) restrain the respondent from harassing, stalking, or threat-
ening an intimate partner of the respondent or child of
such intimate partner or the respondent, or engaging in
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in rea-
sonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(3) either include a finding that the respondent represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate part-
ner or child or by its terms explicitly prohibit the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury.25
The federal law defines the term “intimate partner” for pur-
poses of section 922(g)(8) as a spouse or former spouse of the
respondent, a person who is a parent of the child of the respon-
dent, or a person who cohabits or has cohabited with the
respondent.26
Provided that these requirements have been satisfied, mere
possession of a firearm or ammunition will subject a defendant
to prosecution under section 922(g)(8).  The order itself need
not prohibit possession of firearms, and the respondent need
not have violated the order itself in any way.  The federal law
does, however, require that the possession be “knowing” to
support a prosecution.27 Section 922(g)(8) applies only for the
duration of the qualifying protection order.
In addition to section 922(g)(8), the 1994 amendments to
the Gun Control Act included 18 U.S.C. section 922(d)(8),
which makes it a federal crime to sell or transfer a firearm or
ammunition to a person knowing or having reasonable cause
to believe that the person is
subject to a qualifying pro-
tection order.  The same
requirements discussed
above in reference to sec-
tion 922(g)(8) apply to
protection orders under
section 922(d)(8).28 The
intent behind section
922(d)(8) takes on special
significance for state court
judges when respondents
petition a court for the
return of guns that have
been seized pursuant to
state or federal law.  If the
court knows or has reason-
able cause to believe that
the respondent is subject to
an active protection order that satisfies section 922(d)(8) (as
where a criminal court is petitioned for return of weapons but
is aware of a qualifying protection order issued by a sister civil
court), it should not return the firearms.  As described more
fully below, good judicial practice would be to search, prior to
returning any firearms, all available records to determine
whether a person is subject to a firearms disqualification under
state or federal law.
A limited exception to sections 922(g)(8) and 922(d)(8)
exists for law enforcement officers, armed forces personnel,
and other local, state, and federal employees who are required
to use weapons as part of their official duties.  Under 18 U.S.C.
section 925(a)(1), sometimes referred to as the “official-use
exemption,” the prohibitions in sections 922(g)(8) and
922(d)(8) do not apply to firearms that are received or pos-
sessed by such individuals for use in performing official duties
on behalf of a federal, state, or local agency.  Personal weapons,
however, are not covered by the exemption.29
In 1996, Congress enacted the second important amend-
ment to the Gun Control Act related to domestic violence.
Known as the “Lautenberg Amendment,” the new law added
persons who have been convicted of certain misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence to the list of those barred by the
federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms and
ammunition.  The prohibition, found at 18 U.S.C. section
922(g)(9), has been particularly controversial because it
applies to misdemeanors and does not include an official-use
exemption for law enforcement and military personnel.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, to Charles Higgenbotham, International Association of
Chiefs of Police (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with authors); see also
National Instant Criminal Background Check Program, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
Federal Firearms Prohibitions Resulting from Protection Orders, 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(8), and Misdemeanor Crimes of Domestic Violence,
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), Presentation to the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, at 5 (July 16, 2002) [here-
inafter NICS Frequently Asked Questions].
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Despite several court chal-
lenges, section 922(g)(9) has
withstood judicial scrutiny and
remains good law.
Which misdemeanor crimes
qualify under section 922(g)(9)?
The definition of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence
requires that the offense be a
misdemeanor under federal or
state law and have, as an ele-
ment, the use or attempted use
of physical force or the threat-
ened use of a deadly weapon.30
In addition, a misdemeanor con-
viction qualifies only if one of the enumerated relationships
exists between the perpetrator and the victim of the crime.
Specifically, the perpetrator must be a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim; a person who shares a child in
common with the victim; a person who is cohabiting or has
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian; or a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim.31
The federal law also imposes two due-process-related
requirements, namely that the perpetrator must have been rep-
resented by counsel (or have knowingly and intelligently
waived that right) and that if the perpetrator was entitled to a
jury trial, either the case was tried by a jury or the perpetrator
knowingly and intelligently waived that right.32
It is important to note that only a “conviction” triggers the
section 922(g)(9) prohibition.  The variety of state court prac-
tices employed to streamline the criminal judicial process can
make it difficult to discern whether an adjudication is indeed a
“conviction” as required by the federal law.  The problem often
arises where some form of delayed adjudication is available to
state courts, as where an “adjournment in contemplation of dis-
missal” may be entered.33 By regulation, the question of
whether a qualifying “conviction” exists is made by reference to
the governing state law: if the form of adjudication is consid-
ered a conviction under state law, it will qualify as a “convic-
tion” and support prosecution under section 922(g)(9).34 In
many, if not most, circumstances, a delayed adjudication will
not be considered a conviction under state law, so to the extent
judges accept such pleas they should keep in mind that one of
the collateral consequences is that the federal firearm prohibi-
tion may not apply against the perpetrator.
Although section 922(g)(9) imposes a lifetime ban on
firearm possession following a qualifying misdemeanor convic-
tion, the statute does provide that firearm possession rights
may be restored under limited circumstances.  Specifically, the
conviction must be “expunged or set aside” or it must be “an
offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides
for the loss of civil rights under such offense).”35
Federal courts have consistently held that section 922(g)(9)
applies to misdemeanor convictions that occurred prior to the
1996 enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment.  The courts
have rejected challenges based upon the Ex Post Facto clause
of the U.S. Constitution, ruling that so long as the illegal act of
firearm possession occurs after the enactment date, the law
does not retrospectively punish acts that were legal prior to the
enactment date.36
Unlike section 922(g)(8), section 922(g)(9) is not subject to
the “official-use exemption” for law enforcement and military
personnel.37 Consequently, a law enforcement officer or mem-
ber of the military who has been convicted of a qualifying mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence is subject to a lifetime
ban on firearm possession, including possession of official-duty
weapons.  Thus, departments may need to terminate or reas-
sign officers who become subject to the ban.38
As part of the Lautenberg Amendment, Congress also
enacted 18 U.S.C. section 922(d)(9), which prohibits the sale
or transfer of a firearm or ammunition to a person if the trans-
feror knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the person
has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence.39 The definition of misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence is the same as that which applies to section 922(g)(9).40
Challenges to the Federal Firearm Laws
The federal firearm statutes related to domestic violence
have withstood an onslaught of legal challenges in virtually
every federal circuit.  Defendants have sought to overturn their
convictions using a plethora of legal theories, including several
constitutional challenges.  To date, the federal courts have
rejected every such challenge, and the statutes remain on solid
legal ground.
Defendants have repeatedly invoked the notice and due
process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
36 Court Review - Summer 2002
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A) (2002).
31. See id. That is not to say that the criminal offense must be named
“domestic assault” or “spousal abuse,” or even that it have as an
element the requisite relationship between the perpetrator and
the victim; rather, to qualify under the federal law one of the enu-
merated relationships must have existed in fact.  See, e.g., United
States v. Meade, 175 F. 3d 215, 218-221 (1st Cir. 1999).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(i) (2002).
33. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 315.3(2002).
34. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.11.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii).  In addition, if the pardon, expunge-
ment, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the per-
son may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms, then the
restriction against firearms possession continues.  See id.
36. See, e.g., United Sates v. Mitchell, 209 F. 3d 319, 322-23 (4th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 849 (2000).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (specifically excluding sections
922(g)(9) and 922(d)(9)).
38. See John W. Magaw, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Open Letter to All
State and Local Law Enforcement Officials” (visited August 20,
2002), available at http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/
opltrleo.htm.
39. Therefore, a court should not authorize the return of a firearm to
a person that the court knows or has reasonable cause to believe
has been convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domes-
tic violence.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(33).
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to attack the constitutionality of both 18 U.S.C. sections
922(g)(8) and (g)(9).  Without exception, the federal courts
have ruled that even if a defendant was unaware of the exis-
tence of the federal law, the “ignorance of the law is no excuse”
doctrine governs.41 Thus, while it may be good judicial prac-
tice to advise defendants of these laws, such notice is not a
requirement.
Defendants have also contended that the statutes are beyond
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, a challenge that
the courts have rejected because both sections 922(g)(8) and
922(g)(9) include a “jurisdictional element,” namely, the
requirement that the firearm or ammunition must have been
“shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”42
Likewise, Tenth Amendment challenges have failed because the
federal courts have ruled that the statutes are federal criminal
statutes that are to be implemented by federal authorities, not
state authorities, and so they neither “commandeer” state gov-
ernments into serving federal purposes nor implicate the states’
rights to regulate domestic relations.43
The Second Amendment provided the basis for the most
highly publicized challenge to the federal firearm statutes since
their enactment.  In 1998, Dr. Timothy Joe Emerson was
indicted in a Texas federal district court for possession of
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8).44 Dr.
Emerson had purchased a firearm while he was subject to a
protection order issued by a Texas state court that prohibited
him from harming or threatening to harm his wife or the cou-
ple’s four-year-old daughter.  Dr. Emerson, who was arrested
after he allegedly brandished the firearm in front of his wife and
daughter, moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting among
other things that section 922(g)(8) violates the Second
Amendment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
finding that the Second Amendment recognizes an individual
right to own and possess firearms and concluding that section
922(g)(8) was unconstitutional because it criminalizes pro-
tected conduct based upon a state civil court order with no par-
ticularized findings.45
The district court decision set the stage for the government’s
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  In a
lengthy decision, two of the three judges on the panel that
heard the appeal agreed with the district court that the Second
Amendment confers on individuals the right to bear arms.46 In
so doing, the majority departed from the conclusion reached by
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every other federal appellate
court to decide the question.47
The Emerson majority did, how-
ever, uphold the constitutional-
ity of section 922(g)(8) as
applied to Emerson, finding that
the law is a sufficiently “limited,
narrowly tailored specific excep-
tion or restriction” to the
Second Amendment right.48
Emerson subsequently appealed
the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari
on June 10, 2002.49
The National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS)
In 1993, Congress enacted a new law intended to prevent
prohibited persons from purchasing firearms from dealers.
That law, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady
Act),50 requires all federally licensed gun dealers to obtain a
criminal background check of all purchasers before completing
a sale.  In most cases, the required background check is to be
made using the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System, or “NICS,” which comprises several computer data-
bases managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.51
Among other things, the FBI search includes an examination of
the federal database that contains information about state-
court-issued protection orders (the National Crime
Information Center Protection Order File) and state criminal
history records.  During the course of the background check,
the FBI conducts a search to determine whether the sale of the
firearm would violate any applicable state or federal laws.52 By
statute, the FBI search is limited to three business days; if no
state or federal prohibitions are uncovered within that period,
the sale is allowed to proceed by default.53
In theory, the NICS background check should prevent an
abuser who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under state
or federal law from buying one from a licensed gun dealer.  In
practice, the system is imperfect, and a disconcertingly large
number of abusers have been able to obtain a firearm in viola-
tion of federal law because the FBI could not complete its
investigation within three business days.54 There are, however,
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kafka, 222 F. 3d 1129, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
2000) (and cases cited therein); Mitchell, supra note 36, at 323-
24 (and cases cited therein).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Napier, 233 F. 3d 394, 399-402 (6th Cir.
2000) (and cases cited therein).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 231 F. 3d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Wilson, 159 F. 3d 280, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1998).
44. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F. 3d 203, 211-12 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (June 10, 2002).
45. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex.
1999).
46. See Emerson, supra note 44, at 218-260.
47. See, e.g., Napier, supra note 42, at 402-04 (and cases cited
therein).
48. Emerson, supra note 44, at 260-64.
49. Emerson v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
50. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
51. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 25.  FBI personnel do not perform all NICS back-
ground checks.  In some states, a state or local law enforcement
agency has been designated a “point of contact” (POC) and is
responsible for conducting the check.  See 28 C.F.R. §§ 25.2,
25.6(d).
52. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.6.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii).
54. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Gun Control: Opportunities to
Close Loopholes in the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System(GAO-02-653), at 17-23 (July 2002) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
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instance, some judges are under the misimpression that they
can “over-ride” the operation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8)
simply by not checking the appropriate space on a protection
order form, or by including language in the order to the effect
that the federal law does not apply against the respondent.
In fact, section 922(g)(8) does not rely upon state law defi-
nitions or standards to determine whether a person is prohib-
ited from possessing a firearm.  Rather, the question of whether
a protection order issued by a state court triggers the section
922(g)(8) prohibition is determined solely by reference to the
specific requirements of the federal statute.  In practice, this
means that the particular findings and terms of the order must
be assessed against the federal requirements enumerated in sec-
tion 922(g)(8), and inquiry must be made into whether the fed-
eral notice and hearing requirements were satisfied. 
Thus, an otherwise qualifying protection order will still trig-
ger the federal prohibition even if the issuing judge rules that
the respondent is entitled to possess a firearm under state law,
or if the judge fails to note on the order that the federal prohi-
bition would apply (for example, by failing to mark a box on
the form that indicates application of the federal prohibition).
Simply put, state court judges do not determine the applicabil-
ity of the federal law.56
All of this is not to say, however, that the actions of state
court judges do not profoundly affect the operation of the fed-
eral law.  In fact, the nature of the conduct proscribed by the
order or of the findings of fact included therein determines
whether the federal law applies.  For instance, by ensuring that
their orders hew to the specific requirements of section
922(g)(8) (that is, that they contain the requisite findings or
prohibitory language or both), judges can facilitate subsequent
enforcement of the federal firearm laws.  In addition, judges
can promote the deterrent effect of the federal law by providing
the respondent with both written and oral notice that they will
be in violation of section 922(g)(8) if they possess or purchase
a firearm while the protection order is in effect.  By indicating
on the order the relationship between the parties as well as the
order’s compliance with the due process requirements of sec-
tion 922(g)(8), judges can also make it clear that a protection
order triggers the federal prohibition.  Other practical steps that
state court judges can take to facilitate enforcement of section
922(g)(8) and the other federal laws are described in further
detail below.
Full Faith and Credit and Firearm Prohibitions in
Protection Orders
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 included provi-
sions requiring the interjurisdictional enforcement of protec-
tion orders.  Codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 2265 and 2266,
these “full faith and credit” provisions of VAWA require states
and Indian tribes to enforce protection orders issued in other
jurisdictions as if they had been issued by the enforcing state or
some practical steps that
judges can and should take
to improve the speed and
accuracy of the FBI investi-
gation.  Doing so would sig-
nificantly increase the likeli-
hood that their protection
orders and judgments of
conviction will be enforced
and that community and
survivor safety will be
enhanced.  These steps are discussed in detail below.
State Judges’ Role with Respect to Federal Firearm Laws
What is the relationship between the federal and state
firearm laws, and to what extent do state court judges play a
role in the enforcement of the federal laws?  Those questions are
the source of considerable confusion among members of the
bench and bar throughout the country.
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding about the rela-
tionship between the federal and state firearm prohibitions
arises when the two sets of laws address similar situations but
differ significantly in their approach.  For instance, we have
seen that under the federal Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)), a person subject to a domestic violence protection
order meeting specific statutory criteria is not permitted to pos-
sess a firearm while the order is in effect.  By contrast, many
states impose such a ban only if the issuing court exercises its
discretion to prohibit firearm possession as part of the order’s
terms and conditions.  In such a state, the question arises
whether a respondent legally can possess a firearm when the
order does not include a state-law firearm prohibition yet oth-
erwise satisfies the federal Gun Control Act requirements.  In
more formal legal terms, some judges wonder whether the fed-
eral law, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
preempts or supercedes the state law.
In fact, this is neither a situation that triggers the Supremacy
Clause nor one that enables the state court judge to abrogate the
federal firearm laws.  Rather, both sets of laws remain in full
force and both apply to this situation.  The respondent would
not be subject to a state-law firearm prohibition, because the
judge opted not to invoke her authority to prohibit gun posses-
sion, but the respondent nonetheless would be subject to fed-
eral prosecution under the federal gun law, because the federal
prohibition is independent of state law.  This analysis holds true
for all of the federal firearm statutes discussed above.55
Confusion also arises over a state court judge’s role in the
enforcement of the 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8) prohibition when
it is a state court order of protection that triggers the federal law.
Especially in states where the protection order form provides a
space for the issuing judge to indicate whether the federal pro-
hibitions apply, some judges misunderstand their role.  For
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55. See NICS Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 29, at 1-2.
56. In fact, when FBI personnel conduct the NICS background check
on a potential firearm purchaser and find that a protection order
has been issued against the purchaser, they are required to per-
form an independent analysis to determine whether the order
triggers 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and do not rely upon state author-
ities’ determinations.  Personal communication with Fanny L.
Haslebacher, Senior Attorney, National Instant Criminal
Background Check Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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tribe, provided certain jurisdictional and due process require-
ments are met.57 That mandate applies to firearm restrictions
in protection orders and requires that such restrictions be
enforced even if the enforcing jurisdiction does not authorize
judges to include a firearm prohibition in a protection order.
Judges must be aware that violation of a firearm prohibition
in an out-of-jurisdiction protection order can be the basis of a
prosecution in the enforcing jurisdiction, using whatever
enforcement mechanism is applied to violations of orders
issued within that jurisdiction.  Even if the protected party
would not have been eligible for the order in the enforcing
jurisdiction, and even if the duration of the order exceeds the
maximum duration allowed for orders issued in the enforcing
jurisdiction, VAWA mandates enforcement of the foreign order,
including any firearm provisions.58
EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PRACTICE
Having a clear understanding of the law is essential to good
judicial practice.  It is also helpful to look at some specific
examples that judges confront in courtrooms on a regular basis.
The following are judicial practices that can help safeguard the
community.  By taking some simple steps in the courtroom and
by encouraging clerks of court and other court personnel to
ensure that relevant information is gathered and conveyed to
the appropriate agencies, judges can do much to facilitate the
effective operation of the state and federal laws described
above.  While we recognize that state law and procedures vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the following should be of
general applicability, regardless of a jurisdiction’s idiosyn-
crasies.
Question the Parties About Firearms
Judges should take every opportunity to ask about the pres-
ence of firearms when issues of domestic violence are pre-
sented.  All court forms that relate to civil and criminal domes-
tic violence cases should have questions regarding the presence
and possession of firearms.  In the civil arena, such forms
include applications for a civil protection order, ex parte and
final protection order forms, requests for extension or renewal
of an order, and requests to vacate or dismiss an order.  In crim-
inal cases, they include bail or condition-of-release orders,
arraignment forms, and disposition orders.  The court should
inquire at each stage of the civil process whether the defendant
owns or has access to firearms—an inquiry that should be
made at both the ex parte hearing and at the hearing on the
merits (final hearing).  The petitioner may not know if the
respondent has firearms, or may be aware of only some of the
weapons.  Therefore, judges should obtain from the respon-
dent, under oath, a list of all firearms to help ensure that all are
relinquished at the final hearing.
Such an inquiry is espe-
cially important at the final
hearing if firearms were not
removed at the ex parte stage,
whether because state law
does not permit removal at
that stage, because the court
did not so order, or because
the defendant did not have
any firearms at the time.  To
reassert control over the sur-
vivor or to seek revenge, a
respondent subject to a pro-
tection order may attempt to
acquire a firearm after being served with a protection order.  If
the temporary order did not include a prohibition against pos-
session, the respondent may have legally obtained a firearm59
and now may pose a significant threat to the survivor’s safety.
Inquiry on the criminal side is equally important.  At the bail
hearing or arraignment, as well as upon a conviction, the court
should inquire and have defendants state under oath those
firearms that they own or have in their possession.  This infor-
mation will facilitate both the entry of a specific removal order
and law enforcement’s retrieval of the firearms.  The court
should remember that if the conviction is a qualifying misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence under federal law, 18 U.S.C.
section 922(g)(9) prohibits possession of firearms.  If state law
permits removal, the judge should order it; if not, the judge
should notify defendants of the federal law and their responsi-
bility to dispossess themselves of any firearms.
Understand the Nuances of “Possession”
As previously explained, under federal law and many state
laws, an abuser may not, upon issuance of a civil protection
order or conviction of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, “possess” firearms.  Frequently abusers will
report having “sold” their firearms to a friend or relative, coin-
cidentally just at the time of the domestic violence incident.
The court must determine whether this is a bona fide sale, and
should request proof of the transaction.  If it was a fraudulent
transfer, further action may be warranted.
Another scenario is where the abuser transfers possession of
firearms to friends or family members, feeling that this may
help ensure retrieval at the end of the case.  Such a scenario
raises questions of “constructive possession.”60 If a respondent
can ask for, or physically retrieve without barrier, any of the
firearms transferred to a third party, such action may not con-
stitute the requisite relinquishment.  A respondent who has
constructive possession of firearms has the opportunity to use
them, which is an action expressly prohibited by law.  A court
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57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)-(b).
58. Specific questions regarding VAWA’s full faith and credit provi-
sions may be directed to the National Center on Full Faith and
Credit at (800) 256-5883, ext. 2.
59. Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not apply to ex parte pro-
tection orders because it requires that the order have been issued
after a hearing of which the respondent received actual notice and
at which the respondent had an opportunity to participate.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Quilling, 261 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir.
2001) (defining “constructive possession” in a federal Gun Control
Act case as existing when “a person . . . knowingly has the power
and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control
over an object, either directly, or through others,” and affirming
conviction based upon constructive, but not actual, possession).
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61. In addition, judges considering whether to enter a deferred adju-
dication order (e.g., an adjournment in contemplation of dis-
missal) should conduct a dangerousness assessment and, if appro-
priate and permitted by state law, impose as a condition that the
defendant not possess firearms.
62. As explained above, however, notice of the federal firearm prohi-
bitions is not necessary to support a conviction.  See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
should order that all such
firearms be truly relin-
quished, for instance, to a
law enforcement agency.
A related scenario is
presented when a respon-
dent, who has been
removed from the joint res-
idence with the survivor,
moves into his parents’
home where access to
firearms is available
(whether they are the
respondent’s own weapons
that he “sold” to them or
gave to them for safekeeping, or they are his parents’
weapons).  The court should consider ordering relinquishment
of such weapons to law enforcement, especially if they are
owned by the respondent.
Another possibility to consider under such circumstances is
to have an arrangement with the federal authorities responsi-
ble for enforcing the federal firearm prohibitions, specifically
the assistant United States Attorney assigned to domestic vio-
lence cases and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms.   They may send a letter to the respondent’s relatives
advising them of the federal laws that prohibit granting pos-
session of firearms to those who are disqualified and warning
them of the significant penalties attached to such a conviction.
Of course, if the parents or others who have been asked to hold
the firearms are present in the courtroom, the court may
address them and so note in the record.  In addition, it may be
advisable to have them sign an acknowledgment of receipt of
the court order, and include language to document that they
were made aware of the federal prohibitions and the penalties
that will attach if they allow the respondent access to the
firearms.
Use All Available State and Federal Authority to Disarm
Offenders
In addition to asking about the presence of firearms, judges
should issue appropriate orders that will provide for the safety
of the survivor.  The court should utilize a risk assessment or
“dangerousness” checklist of some type to determine the pro-
priety of removing firearms if such removal is discretionary.
The existence of prior protection orders, threats, firearms
offenses, suicide attempts, and harm to pets are but a few of the
factors that would suggest removal is appropriate, since all are
indicia of potential serious violence.  By the same token, in
criminal cases such an assessment should be conducted at a
hearing to set bail conditions, as well as at arraignment, and, if
the defendant is convicted, as part of the dispositional order
(whether incarceration, probation, parole, etc.).61 The court
should be careful to order relinquishment at all stages where it
is mandatory under state law, including upon issuance of a
protection order or upon conviction of a qualifying offense.
Build Accountability into the Process
Orders do not mean much, and judicial efforts to provide
safety become moot, if an abuser is not made to follow a court
order and, in the process, kills an intimate partner.  In addition
to issuing comprehensive orders, the court has a responsibility
to ensure that orders are followed and that firearms are relin-
quished pursuant to whatever state process exists.
One effective monitoring mechanism used by some courts
is to require that law enforcement provide an accounting to the
court of all firearms removed, based upon the affidavit that the
abuser signs in court.  If an abuser refuses to relinquish the
firearms, or if law enforcement is otherwise unable to obtain
them, the court may, under appropriate circumstances, issue a
search warrant for law enforcement to obtain the guns or a
bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest for failure to comply
with the court order. 
Provide Litigants with Notice of Federal Firearms
Protections and Full Faith and Credit
No one wants surprises in this line of work, least of all sur-
vivors who may be unaware of the protections afforded or even
abusers who may be unaware of the restrictions imposed.  At all
hearings that result in a state or federal firearms prohibition, the
court should explain, on the record, all prohibitions that apply.
Especially where only the federal prohibitions apply, providing
oral and written notice is an important practice. While this may
take a few extra minutes of court time, it offers the opportunity
to clarify any questions the abuser may have, to create a record
of “notice” to the abuser,62 and to send a message, in the pres-
ence of the survivor, that safety is a priority set by the court and
the community.   Perhaps most important, the court can also
use this opportunity to help the survivor to understand that law
enforcement or the prosecutor should contact federal authori-
ties if there is a violation of the federal law.
In addition, the court should advise the parties that under
18 U.S.C. section 2265, VAWA’s full faith and credit provision,
the firearms restrictions will be enforced not only in their own
jurisdiction, but across the country in all jurisdictions.  Thus,
possession of or attempts to purchase firearms in another juris-
diction will be thwarted, just as they will be in the issuing
jurisdiction.  Both survivors and abusers may be unaware that
federal law mandates nationwide enforcement of protection
orders and all of the restrictions therein.
Enter Court Orders into State and Federal Registries
To maximize enforcement of protection orders, it is imper-
ative to enter them immediately into a state protection order
registry, if one exists, and the federal registry maintained by the
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63. See GAO Report, supra note 54. Over the approximately the same
three year period (from Nov. 30, 1998 to Oct. 7, 2001), the NICS
background check blocked almost 200,000 gun purchases by per-
sons who were legally prohibited from possessing a firearm.  Id. at
19 (chart).
64. See id. at 19 (chart).
65. See id. at 18.
66. See id.
FBI (the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Protection
Order File).  Some jurisdictions have an “automatic feed”
mechanism so that a single entry will accomplish both.  In
some locations, court clerks enter the data directly from the
court; in others, a different state agency is responsible for data
entry.  Whoever holds this responsibility should ensure that
forms are completed appropriately so that the orders can be
entered properly and accessed nationwide.  
It is not uncommon for abusers to cross jurisdictional lines
and violate protection orders or commit other offenses.  If pro-
tection orders are not entered in registries, courts and law
enforcement in the new jurisdiction may not be aware of the
firearms prohibitions and may not mandate removal in appro-
priate circumstances (such as when a new victim seeks an order
against the same individual, or the defendant attempts to pur-
chase a weapon and the FBI or law enforcement in the new
jurisdiction cannot locate the protection order in the federal
registry).
To ensure that protection order information can be entered
into the NCIC Protection Order File, the entering agency must
have specific identifying information required by the federal
database.  Of particular importance is the respondent’s numeric
identifier, which may be, among other things, a date of birth,
Social Security number, or driver’s license number and expira-
tion date.  Some opportunities to capture this information arise
at these points in the process: when completing a petition for a
protection order, the survivor can also complete a defendant
information sheet with descriptive information; upon service of
a protection order, law enforcement can ask the respondent for
proof of identity, including a driver’s license that would indicate
a date of birth, or a Social Security card, or, at a minimum, offi-
cers can simply ask the respondent to state such information;
and at the final hearing, the court can ask the respondent to pro-
vide the information prior to the commencement of the hearing.
Obtaining the numeric identifier will greatly facilitate entry
of appropriate orders into the state and federal registries.  This
will not only provide enhanced protection to victims, but can
also help to prevent any inappropriate arrests or detentions
when identifying information is questionable.
Support the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System by Ensuring that Your Court Is Responsive to FBI
Requests for Information
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS) depends on timely, accurate information to prevent
unlawful firearm purchases.  Because the Brady Act allows the
FBI (or an FBI-designated state agency in the case of “point of
contact” states) only three business days to determine whether
there is any reason why an individual should not be able to pur-
chase a firearm, the relevant information needs to be in the
NICS databases or readily available from the originating court
in order for the system to be effective.
In addition to ensuring that
the information from their pro-
tection orders is quickly and
accurately entered into the
NCIC Protection Order File,
judges can facilitate NICS
background checks by being
responsive to requests from the
FBI for information concerning
their orders and final disposi-
tion records.  Unfortunately,
this is not always the case.  The
General Accounting Office’s
recent study of the NICS sys-
tem’s first three years of opera-
tion, from November 1998 to October 2001, revealed that 95%
of the checks were completed within the three business days
allotted.63 The other 5% is troubling, however, because it rep-
resents permitted purchases by thousands of people who were
prohibited by state or federal law from buying a firearm.  In
fact, the GAO found that nearly 3,000 domestic abusers were
able to purchase firearms simply because the FBI was unable to
complete the background check within the time allotted.64
When the FBI later discovers that a sale should not have
been authorized, the agency asks agents from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to retrieve the firearm.  That
procedure, sometimes called a “delayed denial” retrieval, pre-
sents enhanced risks for the law enforcement officers who
must take back guns from an individual who has already
“legally” acquired them.
Significantly, the GAO also found that while 14% of the
almost 200,000 blocked purchases were stopped because the
purchaser had been convicted of a misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence crime, that prohibition accounted for 26% of the delayed
denial retrievals.65 As the GAO noted, this difference is “dis-
proportionately large” and the unlawful purchases present
considerable risk to public safety.66
What exactly is causing this problem?  Simply put, the FBI’s
lack of timely access to complete and accurate information
concerning the purchaser’s criminal history is to blame.
Clearly, the FBI’s ability to perform Brady checks within the
three-day period is impeded when jurisdictions do not enter
their orders into the NCIC Protection Order File, do not
update criminal history information as it becomes available, or,
even less excusably, refuse or delay in responding to the FBI’s
requests for clarifying information.  Each missing piece of
information means additional personnel time devoted to track-
ing it down from the relevant jurisdiction.  Far worse, when
the necessary information is not found quickly enough, a pur-
chase may be allowed by default and, as occurred in the July
2001 case described at the beginning of this article, the abuser
may use the firearm to kill the victim.  Timely entry of such
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67. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 173-B:5(X).
68. See GAO Report, supra note 54, at 12.
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data is an important element
in promoting public safety,
especially for an at-risk pop-
ulation.  Judges should take
all steps necessary to ensure
that all relevant information
regarding their orders and
criminal case dispositions is
readily available to the NICS
system and that their court-
houses are responsive to FBI
requests.
Develop a Safe Returns Process
When an abuser petitions for return of firearms because a
civil protection order expires or is dismissed at the request of
the petitioner, or because a qualifying misdemeanor domestic
violence conviction has been expunged, the court should take
all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not authorize return
of the firearms to a person who may nonetheless be disquali-
fied.  A typical example is where a civil protection order expires
after its one-year duration and the survivor, after being noti-
fied, decides not to apply for an extension.  On the basis of
these facts alone, it would appear appropriate to authorize the
return.  However, the same respondent may be subject to a pro-
tection order issued by another court in the same state (poten-
tially even the same court) or in another state, protecting a dif-
ferent victim.  Or the abuser may have previously been con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (not
expunged) that triggered a lifetime disqualification from pos-
sessing a firearm. 
The disqualifications follow and flow with the individual
abuser, not the case.  Thus, it is essential that the court perform
a search to determine whether there is any other pending case
or cause that would impose a state or federal firearm prohibi-
tion on the abuser.  It is not enough simply to examine the
pending case.  By so limiting its search, the court may inadver-
tently issue an order instructing a police department to return
a gun to an individual who is legally prohibited from possess-
ing one.
In addition, by providing notice to the survivor that the
abuser has petitioned for a return of firearms, the court may be
able to obtain supplementary information from the survivor
that will assist in determining whether the abuser is a disqual-
ified person.  Of course, notice to survivors will also enable
them to take steps, if necessary, to plan for their own and their
children’s safety in light of the fact that the abuser will soon
regain legal access to firearms. 
A simple and effective procedure to prevent the return of
firearms to disqualified individuals has been implemented in
New Hampshire.  The state statute on protection from abuse
requires the court to conduct a hearing, with notice to the vic-
tim, the defendant, and the relevant law enforcement agency,
before any firearms can be returned.67 The courts and the New
Hampshire Department of Safety have developed a process in
which the defendant completes a motion and affidavit for
return of firearms, tracking the information from the federal
form used for the Brady background check.  The Department
of Safety runs a records check to determine whether there is
any reason the firearms should not be returned to the defen-
dant, including the existence of a disqualifying protection
order, a disqualifying misdemeanor conviction, or any other
disqualifying factor (such as a drug conviction).  If such a rea-
son is found, the defendant is given the opportunity to rebut
the evidence at a hearing.  If no reason is found, the court
issues an order authorizing the return.  The victim is aware of
the petition for return of firearms by virtue of having received
notice.  
This simple process is a good example of collaboration
between agencies and branches of government to promote
public safety.  The New Hampshire Attorney General, the state
coalition against domestic violence, and the state legislature all
recognized the inherent value in such collaboration and
worked together to implement it.
Facilitate the Revocation of Firearm Permits
The GAO’s recent report on the NICS program identified a
threat to survivor and community safety posed by state
firearm-permit programs.  Twenty-six states issue so-called
“conceal carry” permits that exempt the permit holder from a
NICS background check when he or she purchases a firearm.68
In 16 of those states, all such permit holders are exempt from
background checks.69 Although states have procedures for the
revocation of permits when the holder loses eligibility, for
instance, if the holder is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence or becomes subject to a protection order,
there appears to be very little effort to assure that permits are
in fact surrendered.  In its study, the GAO visited six states that
issue conceal carry permits and found that only two actively
seek out permit holders to retrieve revoked permits.  Only one
of the states imposes a criminal penalty against those who do
not surrender revoked permits.70
Absent active monitoring of permit holders and swift recov-
ery of revoked permits, a person with an invalid permit may
nonetheless be able to use it to evade a background check and
purchase a gun.  In fact, that is exactly what happened in the
Christmas Day 2001 slayings described in the first section of
this article.
Judges can facilitate revocation and recovery of conceal
carry permits by ensuring that their orders are transmitted to
the permit authority—be it a court, law enforcement, or
another agency—by entering them into a statewide registry or
by other means.  If the court itself is the permit authority, as
was the case in the Christmas Day murders, judges should
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ensure that a system is put in place to actively monitor permit
holders for potential disqualifying events, including convic-
tions and the entry of protection orders against them.  One
possible monitoring method described in the GAO report
involves electronic comparison of permit holders’ names
against state criminal records databases.71 If authorized by
state law, judges should issue orders requiring permit holders
to surrender revoked permits and use bench warrants to autho-
rize law enforcement to arrest those who fail to comply.
CONCLUSION
Although the phrase may sound trite, domestic violence
and firearms truly can be a lethal combination, endangering
adult and child survivors of abuse as well as the community at
large.  This is not to say that every abuser who owns or pos-
sesses firearms will use them to threaten, kill, or injure others.
Indeed, most do not.  However, the firearm prohibitions
enacted by Congress and the states were designed to be pro-
phylactic, to prevent harm and promote safety under circum-
stances in which reasonable restrictions on firearms possession
are warranted.
State and federal laws concerning firearm relinquishment
for an individual who is subject to a protection order or has
been convicted of certain classes of misdemeanor crimes are
often complex.  We hope this article has helped to clarify the
elements and scope of the federal laws and their relationship to
the analogous state laws.  We also hope judges reading this
article will have learned some useful strategies that they can
incorporate into their daily practice to facilitate compliance
with and enforcement of their orders of protection, as well as
to help ensure effective operation of the applicable state and
federal firearms laws.
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